America in the World | Notable arguments

Gideon Rachman: Obama will be a splitter on the Middle East

Gideon Rachman writes for the Financial Times:

"Historians are sometimes divided into lumpers and splitters. The splitters like to chop problems up into lots of small bits. The lumpers like to link them altogether.

"Would-be Middle East peacemakers can be categorised in the same way. The lumpers want a "comprehensive peace settlement" that links together all the problems in the region - Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Israel-Palestine, even Iran. The splitters want to deal with all these problems separately."

"The attractions of lumping are obvious. The idea of fixing the whole of the Middle East in one go is delightful. And it is true that all of these problems are linked. To take just one example, Iran's poisonous relationship with the US has encouraged it to make trouble in Lebanon and Palestine, by sponsoring Hizbollah and Hamas.

"But while lumping works as an argument, it risks failing as a policy. There are three obvious problems. First, there is the risk of being over-ambitious. If nothing is resolved until everything is resolved there is a risk that you will end up with nothing.

"Second, there is the problem of which end of the lump you attack first. The much-reviled neoconservatives were also lumpers. But they thought that change in Iraq was the key to the transformation of the Middle East. Mr Miliband, in common with most mainstream European politicians, sees an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement as the key to the lump.

"This brings us to the third problem with the lump thesis. It is not clear that progress in one area will necessarily unlock the others. Let us say that the Iranians are miraculously persuaded to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Does that automatically lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state? Clearly not. Or put it the other way round: let us say the Israelis are miraculously persuaded to grant the Palestinians a viable state. Does that persuade the Iranians to abandon all thoughts of pursuing nuclear weapons? Clearly not. In fact, linking Iran and Israel-Palestine could inadvertently do the Iranians a favour, by tacitly conceding them a legitimate role in Gaza and in Lebanon.

"What probably is true is the more modest claim: significant progress in one area would improve prospects in another. So if there were a rapprochement between Iran and the US that involved the Iranians cutting off support for Hamas, the Israelis would feel more secure - and that might make a Middle East peace settlement easier to achieve. Similarly, the establishment of a proper Palestinian state would remove a source of anger and anti-western grievance across the region, and so undermine an angry, anti-western regime such as Iran."

"I think, as a matter of practical politics, Mr Obama will have to be a splitter. The state of the American economy is going to eat up most of his working day. When he turns to foreign policy, the Israeli-Palestinian problem will come fairly low down his list of priorities - behind, in rough order of urgency, Iraq, Afghanistan, climate change, Iran, international economics and Russia."

Seth Jones and Martin Libicki: History suggests intelligence and cooperation with local actors are key to defeating terrorism

Seth Jones and Martin Libikci are the authors of How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda. Their report examines the data on more than 600 terrorist groups over the last forty years and applies the lessons learned to the counterterrorist efforts of the United States and her allies. The Middle East Institute has summarised their event with the authors:

"Jones contended that by examining the historical record of past counterterrorism endeavors, the United States could formulate a more efficient and suitable strategy for combating al-Qaeda."

"Jones detailed the findings of his report. Upon testing various causal factors against historical data, Jones and Libicki concluded that the vast majority of terrorist groups have terminated due to political settlements (43%) or policing and intelligence activities (40%). Military operations, by contrast, accounted for only 7% of successful defeats. Furthermore, the authors discerned no statistical correlation between terrorist groups’ devolutions and economic conditions, political institutions, and breadth of goals.

"What implications do these results have for current US counterterrorism policy? Jones asserted that military force continues to represent a counterproductive strategy for defeating al-Qaeda because it inflicts a high civilian death toll and emboldens terrorists’ “holy war” rhetoric. Instead, Jones posited, by leveraging legitimate local actors and surreptitiously targeting key players, the United States could more credibly and effectively pursue its strategic interests. In practice this means that the US government should support indigenous police forces, target key leaders, and engage in clandestine intelligence gathering and analysis. It should also empower organizations such as the State Department, CIA, and FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, to develop and implement counterterrorism policies in the United States and abroad.

"Thus far, these tactics have accrued auspicious success in places like Ramadi, Iraq where large numbers of Sunni insurgents, with American backing, have joined Iraqi police forces to help rout al-Qaeda in Iraq. Additionally, the use of local Pakistani informants and intelligence agents has led to the capture and arrest of key terrorists like Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (in March 2002 and 2003, respectively). Although Jones admitted the potential failure of these strategies if local populations refuse to cooperate or possess conflicting strategic visions, he reemphasized that the “war on terror” could not be won by military force alone."

Daniel Larison: US interests do not dictate entering into open conflict with Pakistan

As Pakistani troops are deployed to repulse future American incursions, Daniel Larison of The American Conservative notes the support within both of American's main parties for continuing to send American troops into Pakistan to fight the Taliban:

"[T]hese incursions have been administration policy for the better part of a year, and they are the recommended policy of a future Obama administration, and the conventional wisdom among both Bush and Obama supporters is that this is a brilliant idea.  Trotskyites and Obamacons agree–stand up to Pakistan!  By stand up, of course, they must mean fight, since that is what implementing their plan will require.

... [This situation] requires reconsidering what U.S. interests dictate, and it seems fairly clear that they do not dictate entering into open conflict with the Pakistani military.  Were our forces to engage Pakistan’s military, the consequences would be dire for the cohesion of the country, which is indeed every bit as artificial and unstable as Iraq, and for regional stability.  Let’s be very clear about this: if we stir up Pakistan against our presence in that part of the world, we will end up losing whatever gains we have made in Afghanistan and will turn one of the largest Muslim states in the world, and the only one with nuclear weapons, from an unreliable ally to an open enemy."

Osama bin Laden: The irresistibility of weakness

Hardly a new argument but no less notable for that.  Here are Osama bin Laden's words from the summer of 1996 and his view that America had become weak:

"Few days ago the news agencies had reported that the Defence Secretary of the Crusading Americans had said that "the explosion at Riyadh and Al-Khobar had taught him one lesson: that is not to withdraw when attacked by coward terrorists". We say to the Defence Secretary that his talk can induce a grieving mother to laughter! and shows the fears that had enshrined you all. Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took place on 1983 AD (1403 A.H). You were turned into scattered pits and pieces at that time; 241 mainly marines solders were killed. And where was this courage of yours when two explosions made you to leave Aden in lees than twenty four hours! But your most disgraceful case was in Somalia; where- after vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA and its post cold war leadership of the new world order- you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousands American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge, but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the "heart" of every Muslim and a remedy to the "chests" of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut, Aden and Mogadishu."

Max Boot finds evidence that al-Qaeda is in retreat

Max Boot in Commentary magazine:

"It turns out that, far from emerging victorious, al Qaeda in Iraq has been driven out of its erstwhile strongholds in Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala provinces. Its last refuge is in the northern city of Mosul, and even there, thanks to a joint Iraqi-American offensive, attacks were cut in half during the month of May. From Basra to Baghdad, Shiite terrorists loosely affiliated with Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army are also in retreat, thanks primarily to the operations of the Iraqi security forces under the direction of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, al Qaeda has not managed to mount any major attacks on an American target, much less on the American homeland, since 9/11. Those attacks that have succeeded have been fairly minor compared with past al-Qaeda atrocities: a 2004 assault on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, killed five local employees and no Americans."