America in the World | Notable arguments

Matthew Yglesias: The trouble with 'pro-American'

Matthew Yglesias of the Center for American Progress notes the pitfalls of assuming world leaders' attitudes towards the United States are their chief motivation:

"[There is a] tick in American discourse of labeling foreign leaders “pro-American” or “anti-American” as if America is likely to be the primary thing on their mind. But obviously when you’re talking about actors on the other side of the world they’re probably mostly worried about other stuff. People in Pakistan are thinking about India. Indians are thinking about Pakistan and China. Not that they don’t have opinions about the United States, but these kind of considerations are secondary to the main point.

"[I]t’s wrong to look at every situation around the world where some country’s perception of its interests goes against what the United States wants to see happen and then label that behavior as “anti-American.” Countries are going to do things we [Americans] don’t like, in which case it will often be appropriate for us to push-back. But absent actual evidence that the thing we don’t like is genuinely being undertaken with specific anti-American intent there’s no reason to pathologize behavior as driven by an anti-American agenda."

Deen and Landberg: Russia's war with Georgia may revive US-Europe rift

Mark Deen and Reed V. Landberg report for Bloomberg that issues such as European countries' military overstretch and dependence on natural gas from Russia may limit Europe's willingness to support the United States over Georgia:

"Both Europe and the U.S. have serious concerns about Russia and will try to sing from the same hymn sheet,'' said Mick Cox, an international relations professor at the London School of Economics. "Yet the differences of nuance are there, and they matter. Russia is keen to exploit them."    

With memories of the trans-Atlantic spat over Iraq still fresh, all parties want to avoid a repeat. Even so, the EU's proximity to Russia and economics make it harder for the bloc to rebuff its neighbor.    

Trade between Russia and the EU jumped 23 percent in 2007 to $284 billion, making the EU Russia's biggest trading partner and Russia the bloc's third-largest partner. The EU also depends on Russia to supply a quarter of its natural gas.

Fareed Zakaria argues that the next president cannot simply reverse existing policies

Writing in Newsweek, Zakaria claims:

"[B]lanket criticism of Bush misses an important reality... The foreign policies that aroused the greatest anger and opposition were mostly pursued in Bush's first term: the invasion of Iraq, the rejection of treaties, diplomacy and multilateralism. In the past few years, many of these policies have been modified, abandoned or reversed. This has happened without acknowledgment—which is partly what drives critics crazy—and it's often been done surreptitiously. It doesn't reflect a change of heart so much as an admission of failure; the old way simply wasn't working. But for whatever reasons and through whichever path, the foreign policies in place now are more sensible, moderate and mainstream. In many cases the next president should follow rather than reverse them."

The University of Manitoba's Lasha Tchantoridze reviews Rice's exposition of American foreign policy

She writes of Secretary Rice:

"[H]er answer to the question what guides US foreign policy, idealism or realism, appears refreshingly simple: it’s both.

"The new realism in American foreign policy, according to Rice, means that US international concerns for the last eight years have not been guided solely by pre-occupation with major powers, such as Russia and China, but with concerns of human rights and democracy as well. She acknowledges that Washington’s ability to influence strong states is limited, but in terms of enhancing “the peaceful political and economic development of weak and poorly governed states” (such as Georgia) the said ability could be considerable.

"Georgia stands as a beneficiary of such a vision in US foreign policy. American interests in Georgia, and in the Caucasus in general, have been guided by both realist considerations (energy plus strategically important location), and idealistic interests (“Rose Revolution,” democratic reforms, etc.)."

Edward Luttwak attacks "absurd" idea that China will lead global alliance against America

Edward Luttwak in Prospect magazine:

"There is a longing in some quarters to yoke together Bush's perceived mismanagement of America's foreign policy with the diminishment of US power itself. More charitably, one might suggest that it shows a confusion between absolute and relative change. The economies of China and now India have been growing rapidly ever since their governments gave up self-destructive policies, and Brazil and many smaller countries from Israel to Singapore are doing the same. This has diminished the relative wealth of the US and Europe, while at the same time greatly enriching them. It is, after all, enriching to have new markets that import American and German technology and European luxuries, and in a different way it is enriching just to know that hundreds of millions have escaped utter misery and filth to move up into more decent lives, or even affluence. So the relative statistical decline of US and European income has no negative substantive meaning—unless it were true that today's economic capacity will become tomorrow's military capability aimed at the US, if not Europe. Implicit in this is an absurd assumption: that China, India and Brazil and the rest of the fast-growers will form a global alliance to confront the US and Europe—presumably encouraged by the blunders and bullying of Bush. Once again, wish-fulfilment. The opposite is far more likely: China has been the ally of the US over decades, and its enemy only between 1950 and 1953; India and the US had their moment of tension in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan war, but have been slowly converging for two decades. The idea that China is another Wilhelmine Germany, just waiting to convert its new industrial wealth into military power, would make perfect sense if the Chinese were Prussians, supremely dedicated to the service of the state, and personally eager for the opportunity to send their brave sons to war. That describes everything that the Chinese are not, and have never been. The Chinese empire was aggressive and expansionist under the Yuan dynasty and again under the Qing. But one dynasty was established by horseriding Mongols, the other by horseriding Manchus, both the products of foreign warrior cultures. The Han Chinese prefer other pursuits. Perhaps they will change, as cultures sometimes do. But if so, they will confront all the other newly rich allies of the US."