In
all of our briefings, our authors aim to make a reasonable case and
supply the facts and referencing to support the argument made. But some
briefings make a more controversial case than others. We consider this
one of our more controversial briefings.
Ten questions and answers on America’s involvement in Iraq.
Did the US go to war for
oil?
No. In fact the United States
imports only a small portion of its oil from the Middle East. Most US oil imports come
from secure sources in Canada and Mexico. The primary reason for resuming hostilities
against the regime of Saddam Hussein (halted after the ceasefire at the end of Operation
Desert Storm in 1991) was that Iraq failed to meet its obligations under the ceasefire
agreement, particularly with regard to declaring the state of banned weapons programs.
Iraq’s December 7, 2002 “full and complete” weapons declaration was
particularly troubling, recycling past denials and containing little new information,
making it clear that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to abide by the agreements signed in
1991. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington
DC, the administration was deeply concerned that Iraq possessed nuclear, biological, and
chemical and might share them with transnational terrorist groups.
Did President Bush lie about the
Iraqi regime having Weapons of Mass Destruction?
No. However, the United States based
its belief that the Iraqi regime was continuing to develop and covertly maintain WMD
stockpiles on deeply flawed assessments of available intelligence. In 2004, the Iraq
Survey Group, headed by chief US weapons inspector Charles A. Duelfer, confirmed what
weapons inspector David Kay had previously stated before Congress at the interim
publication of the report: that Saddam Hussein did not at the time of the invasion have a
major program for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Several official
investigations including the Senate Select Committee’s 2004 ‘Report on the
U.S. Intelligence Community’s prewar Intelligence Assessments of Iraq’
documented many failures. None, however, concluded that administration purposefully or
maliciously misrepresented intelligence to make the case for war. Indeed, a five volume
assessment of captured Iraqi documents by the US military called ‘Iraqi
Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi
Documents’ demonstrated the extraordinary lengths to which the regime went to
frustrate Western intelligence - attempting to appear to be cooperating with UN
inspectors while at the same time attempting to signal Iraq remained a formidable
power.
Did the United States and
coalition allies intentionally botch the occupation of Iraq, either to justify a
long-term military presence or to split-up or weaken Iraq?
This is frequently-voiced conspiracy
theory in the Middle East does not withstand scrutiny. In fact, the United States lacked
an adequate plan or the kinds of assets required to conduct an effective occupation. The
original post-war strategy was deeply flawed, assuming only a short-term military
commitment during which power would be handed over to an interim government. Coalition
forces quickly discovered that without its dictatorship Iraq completely lacked the
capacity for self-government. Thus, a long term occupation was required.
Wouldn’t more troops have
solved the problem?
No, the argument that simply more
troops were needed for the occupation was wrongheaded. In fact, given that Iraq is
the size of California, has porous borders, is awash with arms, and has a diverse
population of about 25 million (with at least 10 million in eight major cities), it is
amazing that any reputable defense analyst would confidently argue that numbers
alone would have made all the difference. Considering the scope of the security
challenge, 300,000 troops probably would have had just as much difficulty as 100,000.
More troops would have helped, but numbers by themselves are not a silver-bullet
solution. What was required was an effective post-war strategy. That took years to
develop.
Did the US-led coalition simply
create more terrorists by invading Iraq?
Not really. Al Qaeda made Iraq a
major battleground because it had been evicted from Afghanistan and had failed in all its
other initiatives to spread transnational terrorism. The al Qaeda initiative in Iraq only
serves to demonstrate they were a serious threat. Nor has terrorism result in a spread of
the al Qaeda movement. In May 2008, the Human Security Report Project based at the
School for International Studies (part of the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver)
released its 2007 assessment of global terrorism trends. The assessment conclude that
global terrorist attacks are declining—dropping by about 40 percent and matched by
a dramatic crash in popular support for al-Qaeda throughout the Islamic world. Not only
is terrorism in retreat, it has been on the run since 2003.
Has the surge
failed?
On the contrary, the increase in US
combat forces combined with significant changes in strategy resulted in a drop in
violence of around 80% over the course of the first year – with clear signs this
has allowed for economic and political progress. It is true that sectarian violence
before 2007 displaced over 4 million Iraqis, resulting in some ethnic cleansing’.
The effectiveness of the surge, however, has shown this is not irreversible and there are
already signs of reintegrating communities, though national reconciliation will be a long
term endeavour.
The longer coalition forces stay
Won’t Iraqis become more dependent on coalition forces the longer they
stay?
This does not appear to be the case.
Iraqi military and police forces have grown substantially over the last year. The police
forces under the Ministry of the Interior have gone from about 60,000 to almost 400,000.
The Iraqis are also spending more each year than the year before. The Iraqis now
spend more on their own security forces than the United States. Nevertheless, it is true
that Iraq’s budget surplus is likely to grow significantly over the course of 2008
(principally because of increasing oil revenues). The pace of spending has been held back
by various factors, including deficiencies in capacity to oversee government spending
projects.
Is failure in Iraq
inevitable?
No. In fact, the chances of a civil
war, large scale humanitarian crisis, or an ethnically-based partition of the country now
seems remote. Likewise, while Iraq remains a dangerous place, transnational terrorist
groups, ethnic militias, or foreign powers are no longer capable of launching sustained
campaigns to destabilize the government.
Will foreign combat troops have
to be in Iraq forever?
This is unlikely. Increasingly up to
2010, Iraqi forces will probably be capable of providing for most public safety and
national security concerns. Foreign support will remain necessary for training and
sustaining functions, like logistics.
Was it worth it?
That depends. On the one hand,
Iraqis have suffered greatly during the occupation. On the other hand, life for many
under Saddam’s regime was far more brutal. For the first time in a century, Iraqis
now have the opportunity to secure their own future and serve as a force for freedom,
security, and prosperity in the region.
