That America is a friend of Israel is well known. While this
is often explained as owing to an unrepresentative Israel lobby, the
underlying explanation is American public opinion. Pro-Israeli feeling
is very strong among ordinary Americans, who see in a fellow settler
nation a functioning democracy surrounded by hostile undemocratic
states. The record of American foreign policy is also clearly far from
slavishly pro-Israel and anti-Arab, with America often aiding other
nations in the region.
The myth of an all-powerful Israel Lobby
If the notion of an all-powerful Israel
lobby dictating American foreign policy ignores the central fact
explaining why American policies have so often, though not always, been
pro-Israel.
The month after President Truman recognised the state of Israel, a June 1948 Gallup poll found three times as much sympathy for the Middle East’s Jews as for the Middle East’s Arabs. This support has persisted and grown throughout the decades since, with none of Gallup’s polls since ever showing greater sympathy with Arabs or Palestinians than with Israelis. Walter Russell Mead notes the different factors explaining that support, including a common feeling of being settler nations and religious motivations. Israel’s success as the region’s only functioning democracy may similarly have played a part.
Mead concludes on the notion that America’s Israel lobby is the reason for American support for Israel: “a pro-Israel foreign policy does not represent the triumph of a small lobby over the public will. It represents the power of public opinion to shape foreign policy in the face of concerns by foreign policy professionals.” [1]
But nor has this reality meant a foreign policy hostile to the Islamic world or the Arab world. When one examines the cases where America and Israel have differed, such claims do not stand up to scrutiny.
During Suez, America forced Israel and her allies to withdraw from Egypt
America recognised the new state of Israel within eleven minutes of its founding,[2]
and has since been consistently supportive of Israel’s right to exist.
But this has not extended, then or now, to a blank cheque. In 1956 -
just eight years later - Britain, France and Israel combined in a
military response to Colonel Nasser, the Arab nationalist President of
Egypt, who had nationalised the Suez Canal. Although the operation met
with quick militarily successes, it failed because of strong American
opposition. The Eisenhower Administration saw Suez as a distraction
from the ongoing Hungarian revolution, and as potentially leading to a
major conflict. The United States tried to pass resolutions demanding a
ceasefire through the UN Security Council, though these were vetoed by
the UK and France. The US then pledged to sell American reverses of
sterling unless Israel, France and Britain withdrew forces, which would
have precipitated a financial crisis in Britain. Faced with this
pressure, all three countries withdrew.
As the Yom Kippur War came to an end, America prevented Israel destroying the trapped Egyptian army
In
1973, Israel faced a surprise attack during Yom Kippur by Egypt, Syria
and Iraq. After initial setbacks, Israel succeeded in fighting back
against the combined Arab armies, and trapped Egypt’s Third Army.
Again, America stepped in demanding a ceasefire and preventing Israel
from destroying Egypt’s army. The consequences of the war led
ultimately to the Camp David Accords and the US-sponsored peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt. Although aid to Israel has been even higher,
the peace treaty guaranteed Egypt $1.3 billion a year in military aid,
with economic assistance since averaging an annual $815 million a year.
In the three decades that followed, Egypt has received a total of over
$50 billion in aid from the United States.[3]
This reflects a much wider point that America has close relations with
many Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Morocco.
America prevented Israel retaliating against Iraq in 1991, and ignored Israel’s greater emphasis on Iran in 2003
Although
some have argued that America’s stance towards Iraq is motivated by
Israeli pressure, Israel was excluded from the initial war with Saddam
Hussein, after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. The multinational coalition
that formed to oppose Saddam included Arab countries, and Israel
becoming involved on the same side risked the unity of this coalition.
Even when Saddam Hussein fired missiles on Israel in the hope of
provoking Israel to respond, Israel bowed to heavy American pressure
and did not retaliate.
The belief that America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was pushed by Israel similarly ignores how the documented Israeli pressure was actually to understand Iran as the greater threat. Lawrence Wilkerson, chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, notes: "The Israelis tried their best to persuade us that we were focused on the wrong enemy, and that they were very leery of destroying the balance of power in the Middle East.”[4]
Despite the support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation for Iraq during the initial conflict, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both made considerable efforts to help the Palestinians achieve their objectives – the latter committing the US to the vision of a Palestinian state.
The overall historical record: America has consistently aided Arab and Muslim states
In
all, the notion that American foreign policy has been unduly anti-Arab
or anti-Muslim is contrary to the overwhelming trend of recent decades.
As the Middle East scholar Barry Rubin noted in Foreign Affairs in
2002: “The overall tally, in fact, is staggering: during the last
half-century, in 11 of 12 major conflicts between Muslims and
non-Muslims, Muslims and secular forces, or Arabs and non-Arabs, the
United States has sided with the former group.” Those conflicts are:
“Muslim versus non-Muslim states: Turkey vs. Greece, Bosnia vs.
Yugoslavia, Kosovo vs. Yugoslavia, Pakistan vs. India, Afghans vs.
Soviets, and Azerbaijan vs. Armenia. Arab versus non-Arab states: Iraq
vs. Iran. Muslim states versus secular forces: Saudi Arabia and other
monarchies vs. Egypt, Jordan and other regimes vs. Syria and Iraq, and
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia vs. Iraq.”[5]
[1] 'The New Israel and the Old', Walter Russell Mead, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008, at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87402/walter-russell-mead/the-new-israel-and-the-old.html?mode=print
[2] 'The New Israel and the Old', Walter Russell Mead, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2008, at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87402/walter-russell-mead/the-new-israel-and-the-old.html?mode=print
[3] '$50 billion later, taking stock of US aid to Egypt', Charles Levinson, Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 2004, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0412/p07s01-wome.html
[4] 'The Usual Suspect', Jeffrey Goldberg, The New Republic, 8 October 2007, at http://www.tnr.com/currentissue/story.html?id=523b5134-8643-4f5e-a314-ac9b8a786b16&p=1
[5] ‘The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism’ Barry Rubin, Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, No. 6, pp.73-86, 2002
