America in the World

Obama highlights seven key changes in American foreign policy since Bush left White House

In a major speech to the United Nations yesterday Barack Obama set out the ways in which American foreign policy had already changed since he became President:

1. Closing Guantanomo: "On my first day in office, I prohibited -- without exception or equivocation -- the use of torture by the United States of America. I ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed, and we are doing the hard work of forging a framework to combat extremism within the rule of law."
2. Withdrawing from Iraq: 'We have removed American combat brigades from Iraqi cities, and set a deadline of next August to remove all our combat brigades from Iraqi territory."
3. Reductions in America's nuclear arsenal: "I have outlined a comprehensive agenda to seek the goal of a world without nuclear weapons."
4. A new effort at Middle East Peace: "I appointed a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, and America has worked steadily and aggressively to advance the cause of two states -- Israel and Palestine -- in which peace and security take root, and the rights of both Israelis and Palestinians are respected."
5. Global leadership against climate change: "To confront climate change, we have invested $80 billion in clean energy.  We have substantially increased our fuel-efficiency standards.  We have provided new incentives for conservation, launched an energy partnership across the Americas, and moved from a bystander to a leader in international climate negotiations."
6. Action against the global recession: "We worked with the G20 nations to forge a coordinated international response of over $2 trillion in stimulus to bring the global economy back from the brink."
7. A new respect for the United Nations: "We have paid our bills.  We have joined the Human Rights Council.  (Applause.)  We have signed the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  We have fully embraced the Millennium Development Goals.  And we address our priorities here, in this institution  -- for instance, through the Security Council meeting that I will chair tomorrow on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and through the issues that I will discuss today."

Read the full speech here.

President Obama gave the speech on the day when the New York Times reported that the White House was reconsidering its strategy in Afghanistan. Vice President Joe Biden disagrees with US generals on the ground that more troops are needed. "Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban," the New York Times suggested, "American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics."

It is not clear if the consideration of alternatives represents a real change of heart since Obama promised an Iraq-style troops surge or is a necessary exercise to reassure Democrats that all alternative options have been explored.

Israel PM Netanyahu accepts principle of Palestinian state after pressure from White House

Israel's PM made the policy shift after pressure from Barack Obama. Mr Netanyahu insisted that recognition would have to be linked to Palestinian demilitarisation and, against the White House's wishes, he declined to change policy on Israel settlements on the West Bank. The Times:

"Binyamin Netanyahu threw down the gauntlet to the US last night, grudgingly agreeing to a limited Palestinian state that would be demilitarised and not in control of its airspace or borders. The hawkish Prime Minister insisted that Israel would never give up a united Jerusalem as its capital, and said that established Jewish settlements in the West Bank would continue to expand — despite explicit objections from Washington."

US Defence Secretary suggests military strike on Iran's nuclear capacity would be counter-productive

The LA Times is reporting that US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has told US Marines that any strike against Iran and its emerging nuclear capacities would be counter-productive in all but the short-term.

Secretary Gates warned that a strike against Iran would only "cement [the nation's] determination to have a nuclear program, and also build into the whole country an undying hatred of whoever hits them."  He said that the only way of avoiding a nuclear Iran would be if "Iranians themselves decide it's too costly."

Israeli President Shimon Peres caused alarm in Washington at the weekend when he warned that Israel would strike Iran if President Obama's offer of dialogue with Tehran failed.  Israel's President also said, however, that "we certainly cannot go it alone, without the US, and we definitely can't go against the US."

It is not clear if Israel's new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, shares Peres' belief that America can veto action.  The headline of a recent Natanyahu interview was: Stop Iran, Or I Will.

Gaza is Obama's first big foreign policy headache

In just twelve days' time Barack Obama will become the 44th President of the United States of America.  Much of the world expects big changes in foreign policy.  Those expectations will meet their first test with the incoming administration's handling of the Gaza crisis.  Up until now Mr Obama has said that there is only one President and one Secretary of State at a time and it is not for him to send out different messages from the current administration.  Al-Jazeera has criticised this as a "deafening silence".  The silence ends after Obama's Inauguration, however.  This is what he said on Tuesday (our emphasis):

"The loss of civilian life in Gaza and in Israel is a source of deep concern to me, and after January 20th I’ll have plenty to say about the issue."

Many supporters of Israel are hopeful that American policy will remain broadly supportive.  Visiting Sderot last July - an Israeli town that is particularly vulnerable to Hamas' rocket attacks - Obama said that "no country would find it acceptable to have missiles raining down on the heads of their citizens."  He went on top say that it would be "very hard to negotiate" with Hamas because it does not recognize Israel's right to exist, has a record of terrorist activity and has been supplied with weapons from other nations hostile to Israel.

In the speech below - again from last year (June) - he promised an audience of American Jews that he "would never compromise when it comes to Israel's security":

There will be some change, however, from the Bush administration. Obama has already promised to engage more directly with problem states such as Iran and one of the people - Richard Haass - tipped to be part of his Middle East team advocated low level contact with Hamas in an article written before the current outbreak of hostilities.  Don't be surprised, however, if policy is more notable for continuity than change.

Can American support for embattled allies risk war as well as prevent it?

In Notable Arguments, we cover an important article by Gideon Rose, the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, reflecting both on US backing for Georgia and Taiwan in light of the notion of moral hazard: "offering insurance to somebody often leads them to take greater risks than they otherwise would".

"If Georgia had not been led to believe that the United States might back it in a crisis, it probably would have played its hand more carefully -- and whatever compromises it might have had to make, it would have been better off as a result. This sort of thing happens all the time, and shows why great powers need to be careful lest their dependents embroil them in unnecessary conflicts."

Rose contrasts this with America's handling of Taiwan, where ambiguity about just how much support America will actually provide in the case of a Chinese invasion has continually prevented conflict. China is deterred from invading while Taiwan is deterred from the sort of measures, such as a declaration of independence, that China would consider a provocation. This approach has been continued during the Bush administration - successfully.

The article concludes:

"It is only natural for small democratic states living in bad neighborhoods to seek American support and protection, and in certain cases it is entirely appropriate for the United States to give it to them. But when it chooses to do so, the U.S. should make clear that along with the backing comes the responsibility to act prudently -- and should, without sentiment, use all the tools at its disposal to enforce the deal. The Bush 43 team has recognized this in Asia but forgot it in the Caucasus. How forcefully it would handle a third such case in the Middle East during its final months remains unclear."

This balanced perspective - accepting the value of American support for some small and embattled countries, but pointing out the potential hazards - makes a persuasive and potentially troubling case for those who support American global leadership. The obvious good America continues to do is acknowledged, but inherent dangers also highlighted.

America is cast as an essential part of preventing war between Israel and many of her neighbours, between China and Taiwan, between Russia and pro-Western states such as Georgia, and so on. But she is also as the country that can, with misjudgements, encourage one side to provoke a war. To characterise the balance in comical and amoral terms, America is the older brother, bigger than anyone else in the violent playground, offering protection to his weaker sibling: while he may be doing the right thing, there is at least the risk that his younger brother may feel incautious or invincible - free to provoke anyone else, knowing he can always rely on him to back him up or even do the fighting.

Taiwan's case in particular - at least hitherto - demonstrates the advantages of ambiguity as opposed to a strict and public declaration of those situations where America is willing to go to war. An unambiguous commitment or alliance will be taken most seriously, precisely because it removes the discretion of the power that makes it to decide whether or not to act. But removing this discretion risks empowering the smaller power, who may calculate that the risks of a total war are outweighed by the advantages of pursuing a particular objective that it takes very seriously, even if the United States would not make the same calculation.

22% of world opinion blames US or Israel for 9/11

On the seventh anniversary of 9/11:

"A new WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 17 nations finds that majorities in only nine of them believe that al Qaeda was behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. In no country does a majority agree on another possible perpetrator, but in most countries significant minorities cite the US government itself and, in a few countries, Israel. These responses were given spontaneously to an open-ended question that did not offer response options. On average, 46% say that al Qaeda was behind the attacks while 15% say the US government, 7% Israel, and 7% some other perpetrator. One in four say they do not know."

Noam Chomsky - a major critic of the Bush administration and, in many ways, an 'anti-American' - explains in the video below why the US government could not have had anything to do with 9/11: