America in the World's Briefings: China

When considering the alternatives to American global leadership, China has emerged as the most likely power to supplant the United States in the Asia Pacific region. But Chinese policies consistently suggest a “Pax Sinica” will countenance (and nurture) authoritarian regimes and neglect human rights and humanitarian aid; ignore proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; support state sponsors of terror; undermine global free trade principles; promote a state-mercantilist “Beijing consensus” agenda, ignore environmental despoliation and damage to biodiversity; and demand that Europe, the United States and Japan bear the full weight of Climate Change sacrifices.

China supports repression in Sudan and Zimbabwe
For over a decade, Beijing has been a top supplier of weaponry and military supplies to Sudan, and has raised few (if any) objections to Khartoum’s continued use of new Chinese weapons in the ongoing state-sponsored genocide in Darfur. Instead, China’s President Hu Jintao greeted Sudan’s visiting Vice President Taha in June with assurances of China’s “mutual respect,” and “sincere friendship;” while Taha beamed that Sudan-China relations were “the template” for excellent state-to-state relations. Taha, the Chinese state-media reported, “was quite pleased with his visit.”[1] The Chinese foreign ministry and media suggest Western concerns about genocide in Darfur are “hyped”. In July 2008, the BBC uncovered evidence that Chinese weapons and military equipment were still being shipped to Sudan for use in Darfur, in violation of UN sanctions resolutions.[2]

Beijing defends Burmese human rights abuses, and the Junta’s foot-dragging on cyclone relief
Historically, Beijing has defended the Burmese Junta’s human rights abuses (including the virtual enslavement for months at a time of thousands of Burmese working on state construction projects). When the United States challenges China’s stance on Burma, the Chinese make it clear that, whatever the resolution of Burma's "internal affairs," it be achieved "independently" of foreign pressure. When the Burmese army suppressed the September 2007 Buddhist monks’ demonstrations, Chinese media downplayed the scope of arrests and killings, and the Chinese government suggested that the Western media was “hyping” the issue.[3] Although China reportedly interceded to get U.N. envoys into Rangoon, it did nothing when the Burmese Junta insulted the envoys and expelled others. Beijing’s foreign ministry simply said “China supports Myanmar's efforts in maintaining stability and realizing democracy and development . . . Unbridled sanctions and pressure will not help.” China’s foreign ministry said the world should be “objective when viewing the Myanmar situation” and provide “constructive assistance” rather than refusing to do business there.[4] On May 2, 2008, when the Cyclone Nargis devastated southern Burma killing 130,000, the Burmese Junta refused to permit international relief into the stricken areas, insisting all supplies be channelled through the Junta. Two weeks later, with the disaster deepening, China “urged the international community to respect Myanmar's sovereignty . . . and have friendly consultation with Myanmar on the specific forms of assistance.”[5] One month after the cyclone, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates opined that the Burmese Junta was guilty of “criminal neglect” for blocking large-scale international aid to cyclone victims.

China ensured the success of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.
Chinese engineers and technicians provided essential services to Pakistan in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its short and medium range ballistic missiles.[6] Pakistan transferred Chinese nuclear weapons designs to Iran,[7] Syria,[8] Libya[9] – and late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto reportedly revealed that Pakistan transferred Chinese nuclear weapons designs to North Korea in return for North Korean missile technology. There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Bhutto discussed North Korea’s nuclear ambitions with Chinese Premier Li Peng during her visit to Beijing in December 1993 – en route to Pyongyang, where she delivered the weapons designs to Kim Il-sung.[10]

China aids North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions
Chinese assistance has always been essential to Pyongyang's plutonium separation program. Since 2002, the United States has sanctioned Chinese companies for providing North Korea with tributyl phosphate, an acid solvent used in the extraction of uranium and plutonium salts from nuclear reactor effluents[11] in April 2004, incongruously just one month before the US State Department recommended that China be admitted to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, an informal international nonproliferation organization.[12] In 2003, at US insistence, China interdicted one such shipment[13] but there is no indication that China has made any other effort to enforce its export controls on North Korea. It is the opinion of at least the arms control experts at the U.S. State Department that China enforces its rules “only under the imminent threat, or in response to the actual imposition, of sanctions” and that China’s failure to respond is not so much an “inability” to enforce its export regulations as an “unwillingness” to do so.[14] Moreover, North Korea's highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, could not have been undertaken without Chinese assistance. It was supplied by Pakistani air force cargo planes via Chinese airspace (and which refuelled at Chinese military bases) – in exchange for North Korean nuclear-capable missiles which returned to Pakistan through China.[15] Even during Pyongyang's July 4, 2006, missile tests, China's complicity was suspicious. The tests were observed by a gaggle of Iranian technicians who had arrived for the launches via flights from Beijing.[16]

China has been a diplomatic protector of Iran
Despite 15 years of repeated protests from Washington, China continues to export nuclear technology, chemical weapons precursors and guided missiles to Iran. Indeed, China is one of Iran’s top two weapons suppliers (with Russia). Areport in 2004 by the US-China Commission stated that “Chinese entities continue to assist Iran with dual-use missile-related items, raw materials and chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology” and noted that the transfers took place after the Chinese government pledged in December 2003 not to give missile technology to Iran.[17] On August 10, 2005, the day Iran broke International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals at a uranium enrichment plant, China's UN ambassador, Wang Guangya, told reporters “I think it is up to [the IAEA in] Vienna to come up with a solution. I think it is not up to the Security Council,” and added “the Council has too many things on the table. Why should we have more?”[18] Given China’s lack of interest, Iran unsurprisingly continued to remove its uranium enrichment facilities from IAEA eyesight. On January 10, 2006, Iran finally removed the last remaining IAEA seals from its nuclear enrichment laboratories. Yet, the day before, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in Beijing to brief him “about the views and considerations of the Iranian side.” As one Washington commentator put it, “in other words, Tehran cleared its action with Beijing.”[19] This might explain why China managed to water down subsequent IAEA language censuring Iran. Said one western official in dry diplomatic understatement, “technically, China is being difficult.” In May 2006, it was revealed that Iran had used uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) imported from China in its initial uranium enrichment (after which domestic supplies were used)[20]. Since then, China has insisted on “diplomacy” but no sanctions and no other pressure on Iran. As of 2007, Chinese companies continued to supply Iran with “a large amount of chemicals used to make solid fuel for ballistic missiles” in violation of UN Security Council resolutions calling for “restraint” in aiding Iran’s nuclear weapons or delivery system development.[21]

China continues to support state sponsors of terrorism
In the July 2006, Israel-Lebanon war, Hezb’ollah fighters struck an Israeli destroyer with a Chinese-supplied C-802 missile acquired from Iran, a missile that had advanced anti-jamming devices.[22] Iran is an unapologetic supplier of deadly conventional weapons to Hezb’ollah, and China is an unapologetic supplier of those same weapons to Iran. Through 2007 and 2008, Iran was a conduit for a flood of Chinese-made weaponry to both Shiite insurgents and al Qaeda in Iraq as well as Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan – despite continuous American pleas to cease[23]. China has also supplied small arms to insurgent groups in India and Sri Lanka – and while small arms smuggling on the Chinese border may be common, the fact that Chinese security services have effectively prevented small arms from falling into the hands of Tibetan and Xinjiang separatists – also on China’s borders – suggests, at the very least, that the Chinese government supports illicit export of such weapons.[24]

China’s state-mercantilist economy undermines global free-trade
The United States, for one, blamed collapse of the Doha Round of international trade talks on China’s claims to protectionist privileges as a “developing country”[25], a position that is quite understandable given China’s state-mercantilist development strategy[26] that places its entire economic structure under the absolute authority – although not the day-to-day direction – of the state. Judging from China’s steadfast refusal to open its rice, sugar and cotton markets to poor developing countries in the Doha Round, China has eroded global free trade goals, but will instead seek to maximize exports and protect domestic producers. China’s tolerant record of intellectual property violations, hazardous and unsafe products, government harassment of firms on political grounds, illicit tariffs and rebates all indicate that China, as the “rule-maker” in Asia, is an unlikely to be a leader in global trade liberalisation.

China seeks to profit from Kyoto climate goals, not pursue them
Although China is the top emitter of greenhouse gasses,[27] China declines to participate in Kyoto goals, claiming that it is a “developing nation” and the burden of climate change sacrifices must be borne by the advanced nations. But this is not to say China eschews participation in emissions trading schemes. It encourages foreign investors to claim emission credits by investing in new, advanced fossil-fuel power plants in China – credits that accrue because advanced technology coal power plants will be less polluting than the cheaper ones that China would otherwise build – or may build anyway.[28]

[1] Yang Ou, “Hu Jintao huijian Sudan fuzongtong Taha,” (Hu Jintao meets Sudan’s vice president, Taha), Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, p. 1 at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-06/12/content_37448.htm Wang Nan, Jiao Xiang, "'Su Zhong guanxi kancheng dianfan' – fang Sudan gongheguo fuzongtong Ali Aosiman Taha."– ('Sudan-China ties rate as the template' – Visiting Sudan Vice President Ali Othman Taha), Renmin Ribao, June 12, 2008, p. 3, at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2008-06/12/content_37578.htm

[2] Hilary Andersson, “China ‘is fuelling war in Darfur’,” BBC News, July 14, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm.

[3] Chinese "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 27 September 2007," http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t367779.htm.

[4] TK

[5] TK

[6] “China’s role as a leading provider of sensitive technology to Pakistan has repeatedly strained U.S.-China relations.” See a review of declassified U.S. intelligence and diplomatic documents at Joyce Battle, “India and Pakistan -- On the Nuclear Threshold”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, (no date), at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index.html.

[7] Dafna Linzer, “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified, U.S. Officials Checking Evidence Cited by Powell,” The Washington Post, November 19, 2004; p. A01 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61079-2004Nov18.html.

[8] See also Bill Gertz, “Pakistani nuke supplier tied to Syria,” The Washington Times, May 13, 2006, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20060512-111553-7237r.htm.

[9] William J Broad and David E Sanger, “As Nuclear Secrets Emerge in Khan Inquiry, More Are Suspected,” The New York Times, December 26, 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/international/asia/26nuke.html.

[10] Glenn Kessler, "Bhutto Dealt Nuclear Secrets to N. Korea, Book Says," The Washington Post, June 1, 2008; A16, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/31/AR2008053102122.html. The Bhutto visit to Pyongyang took place at a particularly sensitive time for Pakistan, China and North Korea. The United States threatened sanctions on China for transferring nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan. North Korea was in delicate negotiations with the United States over its refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect its nuclear facilities. So perhaps even the Pakistani Prime Minister believed she was obliged to maintain strict operational security in transferring CD-ROMs of sensitive nuclear data to Pakistan, and therefore needed "an overcoat with the 'deepest possible pockets' into which she transferred CD-ROMs containing the scientific data about uranium enrichment that the North Koreans wanted." Bhutto's visit to Beijing and Pyongyang, her first trip abroad after her October 1993 election as Prime Minister, were marked by gushing oratorical paeans to Pakistan-China and Pakistan-North Korea friendship, including Bhutto's own avowal that "nuclear nonproliferation should not be made a pretext for preventing states from fully exercising their right to acquire and develop nuclear technology"; See "'Text' of Bhutto Banquet Speech," Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean, December 30, 1993, transcribed by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report at FBIS-EAS-93-249. In a perhaps telling moment, the North Korean media noted that Kim Il Sung and Bhutto exchanged gifts, and -- unusually -- noted that each "saw the [other's] gift and expressed thanks for it." See "Kim Il-song, Bhutto Exchange Gifts", FBIS Daily Report, December 30, 1993, at FBIS-EAS-93-249.

[11] Bill Gertz, "N. Korea seeks aid from China on nukes"; The Washington Times, December 9, 2002, page A-01 at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5244/is_200212/ai_n19696552.

[12] Private conversations with a Bush Administration official. In May 2004, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told a congressional committee that the U.S. still supported China’s membership in the NSG. He explained, “Let me be clear on the April [2004] cases. And when you talk about, I mean, the Iran Non-Proliferation Act covers all of the export control regimes, not just the Nuclear Suppliers Group list. And most of the sanctions that were imposed on Chinese entities related to things that were non-nuclear (emphasis added).” He then noted, “We haven't seen the kinds of activity that worried us several years ago. That doesn't mean that it's not taking place. It's only that we haven't seen it.” See “U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-Il) Holds Hearing On China And The Nuclear Suppliers Group - Committee Hearing,” May 18, 2004, transcript by Federal Document Clearing House.

[13] See “Remarks at Conference on China-U.S. Relations,” Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, November 5, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/25950.htm . A Rand Corporation researcher sees the Chinese action as a sign of cooperation (Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon - Assessing China’s System of Export Controls for WMD-Goods and Technologies, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, p. 90, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG353.pdf. However, when confronted with a simple question, "Intelligence reports aside, are you satisfied that China is not assisting North Korea's nuclear weapons programs," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told a press briefing on December 17, 2002, that he could not make a judgment on whether China is helping North Korea's nuclear program "without having to base it on intelligence sources," which he could not do. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/16081.htm.

[14] See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Paula A. DeSutter in Hearings conducted by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission entitled “China’s Proliferation Practices and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis” on July 24, 2003, pp. 7-31 at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2003hearings/hr03_7_24.php. This comment appears on p. 26.

[15] Danny Gittings, “Battling the Bribers,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2002, p. 18. See also David E. Sanger and James Dao, “A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence: U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea,” The New York Times, October 18, 2002, p. A1. A compelling case that the Pakistani shipment transited Chinese military bases is made by Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, “N. Korea, Pakistan, China,” The Washington Times, December 8, 2002.

[16] For initial reporting see Takashi Arimoto, “Iran no Misairu gijutsusha houchou, tepodon hassha junbi sanka ka” (Iranian missile technicians in North Korea to observe preparations for tests), Sankei Shinbun, Tokyo, July 1, 2006, p.1. That North Korean missile technicians are in Iran was reported at Gordon Fairclough, “Pyongyang Deepens Tehran Ties With Suspected Arms Exports”, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2006, p. A4 at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115212320912498575.html. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill at first confirmed in Senate testimony reports that Iranians witnessed the July 4 tests, saying, “Yes, that is my understanding" and it is “‘absolutely correct’ that the relationship is worrisome.” He later demurred that he was “I didn't mean to confirm them because frankly, I don't know . . . if they 'witnessed' the July 4th or the July 5th missile launch." For the Senate Testimony, see “U.S.: Iranians witnessed N. Korea missile test,” Reuters, July 20, 2006. For the demurral, see “East Asia Update - Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Foreign Press Center Briefing”, July 21, 2006, at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/69311.htm.

[17] See 2004 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2004, p.128, at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2004/04annual_report.pdf. See also Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, Central Intelligence Agency, at

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm#iran.

[18] “UN Council should not hear Iran nuke dispute: China”, Reuters, August 10, 2005.

[19] William R. Hawkins, “China collusion with Iran . . . Walking into a trap?” The Washington Times, February 13, 2006, p. A18.

[20] “Iran Using Chinese-made Feedstock for Enriched Uranium: Diplomats,” AFP, May 18, 2006; Iranian Students News Agency, May 19, 2006 (cited in Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, December 13, 2007, p. 14-15.)

[21] Kan, “China and Proliferation,” p. 15.

[22] Private interviews with U.S. government officials. See also Ze'ev Schiff, "The Lessons of War -- Navy was Warned," Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), August 30, 2006.

[23] Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring, China Arming Terrorists,” The Washington Times, June 15, 2007, Pg. 5; John J. Tkacik Jr., “The Arsenal of the Iraq Insurgency; It's made in China,” The Weekly Standard Volume 012, Issue 45, August 13, 2007, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/956wspet.asp; Paul Danahar “Taliban 'getting Chinese weapons',” BBC, London, September 3, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/6975934.stm.

[24] Manu Pubby, “China emerging as main source of arms to N-E rebels: Jane's Review,” The Indian Express (Mumbai). May 22, 2008, at http://www.indianexpress.com/story/312894.html.

[25] John W. Miller, “China Objection Threatens Trade Deal; Doha Talks Set Back As Beijing Protests Proposal on Tariffs,” The Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2008; p. A9, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121728852084491479.html.

[26] Mure Dickie, “China blames the west for global warming,” Financial Times, February 6 2007, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e7301c1e-b5fc-11db-9eea-0000779e2340.html.

[27] Roger Harrabin, “China ‘now top carbon polluter,’” BBC News, April 14, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7347638.stm.

[28] Jeffrey Ball, “U.N. Warming Program Draws Fire; Fund Designed to Spur Renewable Energy Subsidizes Gas Plants,” The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2008; p. A1, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121573736662544537.html.